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According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of Phreesia’s slowing demand and reduced visibility in key revenue streams, notably, the weakened pharmaceutical marketing commitments in its Network Solutions segment.

On March 30, 2026, Phreesia announced significantly reduced revenue growth projections for fiscal year 2027 guidance. The Company attributed the shortfall against its prior guidance to a combination of macroeconomic factors including “worsening visibility” and weaker pharmaceutical marketing commitments within its Network Solutions segment.

Following this news, the price of Phreesia’s common stock declined from a closing market price of $11.41 per share on March 30, 2025, to $8.38 per share on March 31, 2026, a decline of about 27%.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of Commvault’s ARR growth environment; pertinently, Commvault knew or recklessly disregarded that the Company’s ARR growth guidance failed to properly factor in crucial variables, such as the type of sale. On January 27, 2026, Commvault published third quarter 2026 fiscal results, which included ARR growth below the guidance provided by the Company. In particular, ARR growth for the third quarter 2026 was $39 million, which fell short of the $45 million projection provided. Following this news, the price of Commvault’s common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $129.36 per share on January 26, 2026, Commvault’s stock price fell to $89.13 per share on January 27, 2026, a decline of over 31% in a single day.

(1) Sportradar intentionally worked with black-market gambling operators to increase its revenues, despite its assurances of strict legal and regulatory compliance and claims that ethics and integrity were crucial for Sportradar’s operations; (2) the Company’s know-your-customer and compliance processes were not as robust as defendants’ had claimed; and (3) as a result, defendants’ statements about the Company’s business, operations, and prospects lacked a reasonable basis.

(1) the Company inaccurately recorded and/or misclassified certain revenue and costs; (2) as a result, the Company overstated its revenue, assets, accounts receivable, royalties and other comprehensive income; (3) Veritone maintained deficient internal controls over accounting and financial reporting; (4) as a result of the foregoing, the Company would be forced to restate certain of its financial statements, and (5) as a result, defendants’ positive statements about the Company’s business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

(i) AeroVironment understated the likelihood that it would imminently face competition from other vendors for the work it performed in connection with the U.S. Space Force’s Satellite Communication Augmentation Resource program and the U.S. Space Force’s ongoing efforts to modernize the Satellite Control Network; (ii) accordingly, defendants overstated AeroVironment’s business and financial prospects; and (iii) as a result, defendants’ public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

(1) the Company’s first quarter margins had significantly benefited from advanced purchasing of memory components; (2) the Company’s advanced supply of memory components was dwindling; (3) as a result, the Company was experiencing negative margin pressure as it was forced to purchase memory components at rising market prices; and (4) as a result of the foregoing, defendants’ positive statements about the Company’s margins, business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

(i) veterinarian prescription growth and adoption of Zoetis’ Librela, a canine pain treatment, were sharply weakening as clinicians became more cautious following FDA safety warnings concerning serious neurological complications in dogs; (ii) Zoetis’ Simparica Trio was losing significant market share to a lower priced competing canine parasiticide with broader indicated use in a slowing overall market; and (iii) Zoetis’ dermatology products, Apoquel and Cytopoint, were losing substantial market share to a newly launched competing canine treatment.

(i) a supplier quality issue had significantly disrupted deliveries of the Lucid Gravity; (ii) the foregoing was likely to, and did, have a material negative impact on the Company’s business and financial results; (iii) accordingly, the defendants had overstated the purported enhancements to Lucid’s manufacturing and delivery capabilities and overall operations; and (iv) as a result, defendants’ public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

According to the filed complaint, defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: Throughout the class period, WGS repeatedly made statements that would have caused the average investor to believe that the Fabric acquisition would improve the Company’s financials and create efficiencies between it and the Company’s core business. These statements include such statements such as: “There is room to run in terms of reducing COGS in the future by combining the best of capability between GeneDx and Fabric as we lean into the best possible algorithms to optimize dry lab processes.” These and similar statements made throughout the Class Period were false. In truth, defendants knew of, or recklessly disregarded, significant problems in Fabric’s viability that would negatively impact WGS’s overall business and operations. As a result, the Company’s statements concerning its business, operations, and prospects lacked a reasonable factual basis, and shares of WGS common stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

According to the filed complaint, defendants made false statements concerning the drivers of Badger Meter’s “record” financial results, demand for the Company’s products, and its prospects for continued growth. During the class period, defendants told investors that Badger Meter’s strong financial results reflected “ongoing favorable industry trends,” “secular growth drivers,” and “solid operating execution.” They likewise touted “strong” demand and said they were seeing “robust order pacing and a strong bid pipeline that positions us well for continued sales and earnings growth,” and that Badger Meter possessed a “long runway” for growth.

According to the filed complaint, defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that evidence suggests that given the importance of project pegasus to the Company’s business model and finances, the external macroeconomic conditions during the class period, and the Company’s internal budget and resource constraints, at the time these statements were made, defendants knew or should have known that project pegasus would not, and was not on track to, realize the savings, efficiency, or effectiveness that Helen of Troy consistently touted.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of GRAIL’s NHS-Galleri trial following the reveal of the top-line results covering the first screening round. Notably, as defendants have since attested, the trial as executed within the three-year follow-up period was insufficient to demonstrate the achievability of a reduction in Stage III-IV cancers; defendants disclosed the trial period, and thus the screening duration, was apparently insufficient to demonstrate whether the primary endpoint was achievable. Defendants further repeatedly refused to provide detailed topline results or other data from the NHS-Galleri study, potentially concealing known trendlines which arguably suggested either a longer timeline would be necessary or otherwise that the probability of achieving the statistical reduction in Stage III & IV cancers by the trial’s end had been reduced. On February 19, 2026, GRAIL announced that the “primary endpoint of statistically significant Stage III-IV reduction was not observed” in the NHS-Galleri Trial. The Company attributed this shortcoming, in part, on “probably need[ing] a longer follow-up time to be able to [compare the study arms] adequately.” Following this news, the price of GRAIL’s common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $101.53 per share on February 19, 2026, Grail’s stock price fell to $50.21 per share on February 20, 2026, a decline of about 50.55% in the span of just a single day.

(i) PicS N.V. had conducted an evaluation of its credit evaluation procedures in December 2025 and determined that such procedures were deficient and in need of enhancement; (ii) as a result of the new procedures PicS N.V. had implemented in December 2025, PicS N.V. had reclassified approximately R$590 million of exposures previously classified as Stage 2 to Stage 3, leading to an incremental ECL charge of R$88 million in the three months ended December 31, 2025; (iii) PicS N.V. had experienced a heightened, but unreported, Stage 3 formation rate of more than 7% in the fourth quarter of 2025 that deviated substantially from the historical results and trends provided in the offering documents; (iv) the IPO's offering documents had materially overstated the quality and ability of PicS N.V.'s credit models and user data to inform PicS N.V.'s underwriting practices and to allow PicS N.V. to timely and effectively monitor, assess, and identify adverse credit events, credit risks, and credit deterioration across its portfolio; and (v) PicS N.V. suffered from degradations in customer credit quality and heightened risks of default and loan impairment as a result of its entrance into materially riskier business lines leading up to the IPO, resulting in undisclosed adverse financial and operational trends such as heightened incidents of default, which predated the IPO and were internally projected by PicS N.V. to continue to worsen following the IPO, materially impairing PicS N.V.'s business, operations, and financial results.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of Verra’s relationship with Avis Budget Group (“Avis”), and in particular obtaining a contract extension with Avis. Further, the Company minimized concerns that major rent-a-cars could replace Verra with in-house solutions or outsourced alternatives.

On May 26, 2026, Verra issued a press release announcing a termination notice from Avis regarding its contract and accordingly lowered its 2026 full-year financial outlook. Almost one week later on June 1, 2026, the Company announced a sudden and surprising transition of its President and Chief Executive Officer David Roberts.

Following this news, the price of Verra’s common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $13.08 per share on May 26, 2026, Verra’s stock price fell to $3.85 per share on May 27, 2026, a decline of about 71%.

(i) defendants understated the scope and severity of the risk that declining digital asset prices posed to Company’s business and financial performance; (ii) consequently, defendants’ statements regarding, inter alia, BitGo’s financial performance and business prospects as a public company lacked a reasonable basis; and (iii) as a result, the offering documents and defendants’ public statements throughout the Class Period were materially false and/or misleading and/or failed to state information required to be stated therein.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of Roblox’s organic growth potential; notably, that Roblox would see a significant slowdown in its growth rates as enrollment in the age verification rollout would quickly taper, compounding the resulting slowdown in on-platform communication, resulting in app store rating reductions and a swift reduction in organic growth. On April 30, 2026, Roblox announced its financial results for the first quarter of fiscal 2026. Management slashed bookings growth guidance down to 8-12% and a corresponding decline to margin expectations. Defendants disclosed the age verification rollout had caused much more significant impacts to engagement and organic growth than management had previously suggested and age check adoption had only increased to 51% global daily active users, from 45% at the end of the previous quarter. Following this news, the price of Roblox’s common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $55.26 per share on April 30, 2026, Roblox’s stock price fell to $45.13 per share on May 1, 2026, a decline of about 18.33% in the span of just a single day.

(1) ADMA Biologics engaged in an undisclosed related party transaction; (2) ADMA Biologics used channel stuffing to create an appearance of revenue; (3) ADMA Biologics lacked adequate internal controls; (4) as a result, defendants’ statements about ADMA Biologics’ business, operations, and prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

According to the filed complaint, defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that Via Transportation's offering documents for its September 2025 IPO contained materially misleading statements and omissions about the company's growth and business prospects. According to the complaint, Via touted its "successful land and expand strategy," rapid revenue growth, and strong customer adoption, while failing to disclose that its Platform Annual Run-Rate Revenue per customer had already begun to decline and that regulatory and structural issues in Germany—one of its most important markets—were preventing the company from selling its full platform beyond microtransit. The truth allegedly emerged through a series of disclosures beginning on November 13, 2025, when Via reported the first decline in ARR per customer in eight quarters, followed by admissions on February 27, 2026 and May 12, 2026 that the company was facing significant headwinds in Germany and could not move past selling microtransit in isolation.

(1) ERAS-0015’s preclinical data was based on improper comparisons to Revolution Medicines, Inc. (“RevMed”) and placed Erasca at risk of violating patent and trade secret protections; and (2) based on the foregoing, defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their positive statements related to ERAS-0015.

(a) Microsoft’s Copilot family of products had experienced significant brand positioning, user experience, usage, data siloing, computational capacity, organizational, and interoperability problems; (b) Microsoft’s flagship proprietary AI model ranked well below competitors on a number of benchmark tests; (c) Microsoft needed to increase by billions of dollars its capital expenditures and divert GPU and CPU capacity away from fulfilling demand for its profitable Azure services in order to improve the competitive positioning of its critical Copilot family of products and increase its AI-related R&D; and (d) as a result of (a)-(c) above, Microsoft had failed to convert a significant percentage of its commercial Microsoft 365 users to paid Copilot subscriptions and the Company’s Copilot offerings had lost market share to rival products, a trend that was increasing.

(i) defendants overstated purported efficiency gains achieved in NanoX’s operations, as well as the purported increased demand for its products; (ii) in reality, Nano-X’s production and manufacturing operations were poorly aligned with demand for the Company’s products; (iii) as a result, Nano-X was experiencing significantly increased operating expenses and cash burn; (iv) the foregoing significantly increased the likelihood that Nano-X would be forced to take disruptive remedial measures with respect to its manufacturing operations, entailing significant restructuring and impairment charges; and (v) as a result, defendants’ public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

(1) Black Rock Coffee’s new store openings were leading to a cannibalization of its existing services and revenue; (2) Black Rock Coffee overstated the manner in which its expansion strategy was tailored to avoid “sales transfer”; (3) as a result of “sales transfer,” the Company’s financial results were materially impacted; and (4) as a result of the foregoing, defendants’ positive statements about the Company’s business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of Embecta’s fiscal results; pertinently, Embecta knew or recklessly disregarded that the Company’s guidance was misleading and unattainable. In fact, Embecta touted the Company’s pen needle business as “incredibly resolute” mere weeks prior to missing expectations and cutting 2026 fiscal guidance.

On May 5, 2026, Embecta published second quarter 2026 fiscal results disclosing that the Company failed to meet its guidance for second quarter 2026 and lowered fiscal year 2026 guidance. In particular, Embecta revealed that revenue declined over 14%, much higher than the guidance of flat to a decline of 2% and that the Company was lowering estimates on US performance, largely in part due to weakness in its pen needle sales.

Following this news, the price of Embecta’s common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $9.25 per share on May 4, 2026, Embecta’s stock price fell to $3.90 per share on May 5, 2026, a decline of over 57.8% in a single day.

(i) defendants had overstated First Solar’s capacity to manage the impact of U.S. tariff policy on the Company’s business; (ii) defendants understated the extent to which its responses to U.S. tariff policy, including the intentional underutilization of production facilities in Malaysia and Vietnam, and attempted relocation of production to the U.S., were likely to negatively impact First Solar’s projected performance in the 2026 fiscal year; and (iii) as a result, defendants’ public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of ZoomInfo’s slowing growth, its legacy seat-based subscription platforms, and weakening customer retention in its downmarket segment. Further, the Company minimized concerns that customers were moving towards consumption-based usage models and developing internal AI-driven go-to-market solutions.

On May 11, 2026, ZoomInfo announced its first quarter 2026 financial results, unveiling a sharp decline in growth outlook and accordingly lowered its 2026 full year financial guidance.

Following this news, the price of ZoomInfo’s common stock declined dramatically from a closing market price of $6.04 per share on May 11, 2026, ZoomInfo’s stock price fell to $4.06 per share on May 12, 2026, a decline of about 33%.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of Peabody Energy’s Centurion mine and the multitude of issues causing delays to the ramp-up and the return to full longwall production dates. On March 30, 2026, Peabody Energy issued a press release lowering guidance pertaining to Centurion mine’s expected first quarter 2026 output ahead of the Company’s full earnings release. In pertinent part, defendants announced that sales volume from the Centurion mine was expected to deliver approximately 250,000 tons in the first quarter due to mining commissioning challenges (compared to previous estimates of around 700,000 tons). Following this news, the price of Peabody Energy’s common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $39.50 per share on March 27, 2026, Peabody Energy’s stock price fell to $35.68 per share on March 30, 2026, a decline of about 9.7% in the span of a single trading day.

On May 5, 2026, Peabody Energy issued a press release disclosing the Company’s failure to ramp-up Centurion by the long-awaited March 2026 deadline and cutting guidance related to full year met segment volumes to reflect the increased cost and substantial volume decrease. Following this news, Peabody Energy’s common stock declined from a closing market price of $26.52 per share on May 4, 2026, to $25.00 per share on May 5, 2025, a decline of 5.7%.

(1) Futu was not in compliance with the requirements of the China securities regulatory commission, including because the Company continued to conduct securities business, public fund sales business and futures business in mainland China without obtaining the requisite licenses or approval; (2) as a result, Futu was reasonably likely to face regulatory penalties, including the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and other penalties; (3) as a result of the foregoing, Futu’s financial results were overstated; and (4) as a result of the foregoing, defendants’ positive statements about the Company’s business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

According to the filed complaint, defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: Company’s financial statements prepared for the periods from Q1 2023 to Q4 2024, including annual reports for 2023 and 2024, contained material misstatements—caused by the premature and incorrect recognition of certain transactions—concerning, inter alia, the Company’s operating revenue, operating income, revenue recognition, effectiveness of internal controls and procedures, and drivers of financial results and growth. The Company’s financial statements prepared for the periods from Q1 2025 to Q3 2025 contained material misstatements—caused by the understatement of purchased transportation costs and accounts payable —concerning, inter alia, the Company’s operating expenses, purchased transportation and warehousing expenses, operating income, effectiveness of internal disclosure controls and procedures, and drivers of financial results and growth.

(i) Insulet’s manufacturing controls and procedures were defective; (ii) the foregoing created a foreseeable heightened risk that one or more Insulet products would be found to be in violation of applicable safety regulations and/or pose a risk of injury; and (iii) as a result, defendants’ public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning the true state of Photronics’ high-end product pipeline, customer schedules, and the stability of the alleged demand for its products; notably, that the seasonal recovery and design release momentum following the Chinese New Year holiday the Company was claiming would develop had stalled. Photronics was experiencing a critical bottleneck in its design release pipeline that rendered its forward growth expectations unachievable.

On May 28, 2026, Photronics announced its financial results for the second quarter of fiscal 2026, revealing revenue and earnings well-below internal projections and highlighting a critical collapse of IC revenue by 11% sequentially. Management further provided third-quarter guidance below market consensus as the slowdown was expected to continue and margins were expected to continue their trend of compression. Management claimed that the projected seasonal recovery following the Chinese New Year holiday had failed to materialize due to extensive new product launch delays, elevated fab utilization rates, and geopolitical uncertainty.

Following this news, the price of Photronics’ common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $53.51 per share on May 27, 2026, Photronics’ stock price fell to $34.02 per share on May 28, 2026, a decline of about 36.42% in the span of just a single day.

(1) Megan was the subject of a market manipulation and fraudulent promotion scheme involving social-media based misinformation and impersonators posing as financial professionals; (2) Megan’s public statements and risk disclosures omitted any mention of the realized risk of fraudulent trading or market manipulation used to drive the Company’s stock price; (3) as a result, Megan securities were at unique risk of a sustained suspension in trading by NASDAQ and severe volatility-induced decline; (4) the sole underwriter on the IPO, DBC, had conducted numerous microcap IPOs that suffered volatility-induced declines resulting from market manipulation schemes; (5) the Company suffered from material weaknesses in its internal accounting and financial reporting controls; and (6) as a result of the foregoing, defendants’ positive statements about the Company’s business, operations and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.